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Abstract
Using a stochastic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations,
this paper studies a policy rule for the retirement age aiming at o⁄setting the
e⁄ects on the supply of labour following fertility changes. We ￿nd that the
retirement age should increase more than proportionally to the direct fall in
the labour supply caused by a fall in fertility. The robustness of this result
is checked against alternative model speci￿cations and parameter values. The
e¢ cacy of the policy rule depends crucially on the link between the preference
for leisure and the response of the intensive margin of labour supply to changes
in the statutory retirement age.
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11 Introduction
As a result of low fertility rates since the 1960s, the labour supply in most devel-
oped countries is likely to shrink over the coming decades. Since a smaller labour
force increases the capital-labour ratio, an upward pressure on wages is likely to
arise, so the work-leisure choice becomes important.1 In fact, workers might react
quite strongly to a higher opportunity cost of leisure by demanding less of it, thus
countering the e⁄ects of the fertility fall. However, with a strong income e⁄ect, the
net e⁄ect of higher wages might be an increased demand for leisure, so the e⁄ective
supply of labour would be reduced even further.
In this paper we present a model that captures these economic relationships. The
analytical framework is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
with overlapping generations. In a three-period setup, we formulate the explicit
relationship between the extensive and the intensive margin of labour supply, where
the statutory retirement age functions as a proxy for the extensive margin. In line
with Chakraborty (2004), we make the length of the retirement period residually
determined by, ￿rst, the length of the working period and, second, the total length
of life. The novelty of this approach is the feasibility of deriving the implications on
the intensive margin of labour supply to a change in the statutory retirement age.
The analytical framework is augmented by a policy rule for the statutory re-
tirement age that e⁄ectively counteracts the decline in the size of the labour force
caused by a lower fertility rate. Indeed, a straightforward policy response would
be to increase the statutory retirement age in order to retain workers in the labour
force for a longer period of time. The paper studies how such a link between changes
in fertility and the statutory retirement age can be established. Our approach fa-
cilitates an analytical presentation, where the role of each model parameter can be
identi￿ed. For example, analytical expressions can be derived that links the e⁄ect
on leisure to changes in, respectively, the statutory retirement age, the fertility rate
and the preference for leisure.
By assuming that the statutory retirement age is under government control, it
is possible to analyse the o⁄setting response of the statutory retirement age under
alternative demographic and economic contingencies. Our main result is that an
increase in the retirement age has the potential to o⁄set the (fertility induced)
decline in the labour force, provided that the retirement age increases more than
proportionally to the fall in fertility. The reason is that workers substitute for
leisure both when fertility falls and the retirement age increases. Furthermore, an
implication of the increase in the retirement age is that lifetime leisure will fall,
and this further increases the demand for leisure during the working period. As
a result, labour supply will fall not only due to low fertility but also as a side
e⁄ect of the increase in the retirement age. Consequently, policy makers should
account for this endogenous response of labour supply when formulating the optimal
policy to alleviate the impact of low fertility. In this context, we identify the crucial
link between the preference for leisure and the o⁄setting response of the statutory
retirement age: the higher the preference for leisure the more the statutory retirement
1In fact, Weil (2006) ￿nds that the distortion created by taxes needed to fund PAYG pension
systems is a key channel through which a higher dependency ratio a⁄ects aggregate output and
welfare.
2age has to increase in order to o⁄set the fall in the size of the labour force. The
intuition behind this result is due to our unique formulation of the relationship
between the extensive and intensive margins of labour supply.
In the next section we develop the model and the analytical solution method.
Section 3 presents the market equilibrium where we analyse the impacts on key
variables of changes in fertility and the statutory retirement age, respectively. Sec-
tion 4 considers the policy option of changing the statutory retirement age in order
to o⁄set the decline in the labour force and provides robustness analyses. Finally,
section 5 concludes and outlines a number of potential extensions of the research on
this topic.
2 The Model
In this section we outline a stochastic OLG model with endogenous labour supply.
Our model is inspired by Chakraborty (2004), who incorporates the length of life into
a standard OLG model with exogenous labour supply ad modum Diamond (1965)2.
The model consists of di⁄erent building blocks: demographics, households, produc-
tion, and social security. We present these in turn, before outlining the solution
method.
2.1 Demographics
Individuals are assumed to be identical across cohorts, and to live for three periods:
as children, adults and elderly, respectively. We denote the children born in period
t as Nc
t , where Nc
t = btNw
t and bt > 0 is the birth rate. Adults are denoted by Nw
t
and they are assumed to work for the full length of period t. During period t + 1





t ￿ ￿tbt￿1 is the (net) growth rate of the labour force. The factor ￿t denotes the
length of the working period, as illustrated in ￿gure 1.
Figure 1. Adult lifetime: work and retirement
If there is an increase in ￿t, workers would have to remain in the labour force for
a longer time-period. Hence, the e⁄ective growth rate of the labour force increases.
Also, a fall in the fertility rate in the former period implies a shrinking labour force
in the present period. Workers are assumed to elastically supply labour, Lt, up to
one unit, u 2 (0;1), where Lt = utNw
t , and ut is the intensity of labour supply in
the working period. First period leisure therefore equals lt = 1 ￿ ut.
2Bohn (2001) develops a stochastic version of the model, and incorporates the length of the
retirement period in a similar way as Chakraborty (2004) models the length of life.
3The aggregate measure of adult lifetime, ￿, is the sum of the lengths of the
working period and the retirement period, respectively. Thus, retirement, ￿ 2 (0;1),
is residually determined as:
￿t = ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 (1)
More speci￿cally, the total length of life, ￿; comprises an expected component and
an unexpected component, i.e. ￿t = ￿e
t￿1￿u
t , where f￿g 2 (0;2). We assume that
these components ￿t are stochastic and identically and independently distributed.
The same is the case for bt and ￿t. Changes in ￿ will exclusively a⁄ect ￿ if ￿ remains
constant. Based on this formulation, we assume that an increase in ￿ is equivalent
to an increase in the retirement age. Note that changes in e⁄ective labour supply
can therefore be decomposed into three e⁄ects: ￿rst, the e⁄ect from the exogenous
extensive margin, ￿; second, the e⁄ect from the endogenous intensive margin, ut;
and, third, the e⁄ect from the exogenous growth in the number of workers, bt￿1.
It is common in the literature to endogenise the intensity of labour supply, but to
combine this with changes in labour supply at the extensive margin has, to our
knowledge, not previously been attempted3.
2.2 Households
We adopt a log-utility function, displaying homothetic preferences over consumption
and leisure, bearing in mind the well-known limitations of the log-speci￿cation4.





+ ￿2Et [￿t+1 lnc2t+1] (2)
We denote c1t and c2t+1 as ￿rst and second period consumption, respectively. The
discount rate on c2t+1 is ￿2 > ￿1, and ￿ > 0 is the relative weight on leisure in utility.
Decisions about consumption for children are assumed to be made by parents5.
Second period consumption is scaled by the length of the retirement period6.
The higher is ￿; the longer period of time retirees can enjoy consumption. While
the same argument also applies to the length of the ￿rst period, ￿, for consumption
and leisure, we stress that if ￿ increases then some of the "sub-periods" in retirement,
3As a result, if fertility falls by, for instance, 1% and the respons by the government is to increase
the statutory retirement age by 1% both these events may lead to an increased demand for leisure by
households and thus a fall in labour supply. The 1% increase in the retirement age may therefore
not be enough to counteract the general equilibrium e⁄ects that induce workers to reduce their
labour supply. This result is clearly ambiguous and depends on parameter calibration as well as
substitution, income and wealth e⁄ects, respectively.
4A CES utility function could be speci￿ed and experiments be made with alternative values for
the elasticity of substitution.
5An explicit formulation of the optimisation of parents￿ utility over their own consumption
and that of their children is not necessarily important. This is because the optimisation problem
would merely relate ￿rst period consumption of the household to the weight that parents assign
to consumption of their children in utility. The childhood period is conceptually necessary in this
model, though, in order to study a change in fertility in period t ￿ 1 that a⁄ects the size of the
labour force in period t. This relation can be shown to enter into lifetime utility as a weight on ￿rst
period consumption, ￿1(bt) > 0, that depends positively on the number of children, see Jensen and
Jłrgensen (2008). We assume, however, that a 1% increase in fertility would increase ￿1(bt) by 1%,
because parents need to provide more consumption to more children in the household.
6Both Chakraborty (2004) and Bohn (2001) have incorporated the length of the retirement
period into the utility function, but neither have incorporated the length of the working period.
4which are all composed by full leisure, will be substituted by sub-periods that consist
of both labour and leisure in the working period. This has a negative impact on
lifetime leisure. A novelty of our approach is to scale leisure by ￿t to account for
this e⁄ect. As a result, individuals can now account for the disutility of a fall in
lifetime leisure, in case the retirement age should increase, by increasing leisure in
their working period. In this case, the e⁄ective labour supply would initially rise
by the full amount of the increase in the retirement age. But this e⁄ect will be
counteracted if the disutility of less lifetime leisure induces workers to supply labour
less intensively7.
The restrictions on c1t and c2t+1 are presented in (3) and (4),




St + ￿t+1 (1 ￿ lt+1)￿t+1wt+1 (4)
where ￿t is the pension contribution rate, St is the level of savings, and ￿t is the
pension replacement rate. In terms of income in the working period, wt￿t, the wage
rate in each sub-period (say, in each year) is denoted by wt, while ￿t denotes how
many sub-periods people have to work (say, the length of the working period in
terms of years)8.
The gross return to the savings of retirees, Rt = (1+rt), is scaled by ￿ to account
for the fact that savings must be spread across a given length of the retirement
period. In that way, if the retirement age increases so the retirement period is
residually reduced, there will be more second period income in each sub-period in
retirement. In Bohn (2001), ￿ does not depend negatively to the retirement age, and
in Chakraborty (2004), ￿ is endogenous to health expenditure and is incorporated
so it encompasses both the discount rate and at the same time the length of total
life. In our paper, however, ￿ is also endogenous, but it depends on changes in the
retirement age or changes in the total length of adult life, i.e. ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿. Changes
in ￿ is therefore seen to a⁄ect ￿, and that could not be analysed by neither Bohn
(2001) nor Chakraborty (2004).








Note the roles of ￿ and ￿ as implicit prices on consumption and leisure: con-
sumption and leisure must be spread across the lengths of working and retirement
periods, respectively. Utility is therefore increasing in ￿ and ￿, but so are the implicit
prices on consumption and leisure.
By maximising lifetime utility (2) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
(5), two ￿rst order conditions are derived: ￿rst, the Euler equation in (6),
7By modelling the utility of leisure in this way we implicitly add the value of second period
leisure into the utility function without having to maximise explicitly with respect to lt+1.
8If the retirement age increases, and the capital-labour ratio and the wage rate fall, then the
income of workers may either increase or decrease depending on whether the drop in the wage rate
across all sub-periods accounts for smaller fall in income than the increase in income induced by




















Note, that households prioritise less consumption in the ￿rst period if fertility
decreases. This will lower ￿1(bt) in (6) and (7), such that c1t falls relative to c2t+1
and lt. If ￿ or ￿ changes, the optimality conditions will remain una⁄ected9.
2.3 Social Security





where the left (right) hand side illustrates the pension bene￿ts (contributions). Nei-
ther ￿ nor ￿ need to be ￿xed, so the PAYG system can in principle display either
de￿ned bene￿ts (DB) or de￿ned contributions (DC) schemes. To re￿ ect the empir-
ical fact that the DB system is the most widespread PAYG arrangement (Gruber









2.4 Technology and resources
Output, Yt, is assumed to be produced by ￿rms with a Cobb-Douglas technology in




Productivity is denoted by At and is assumed to be stochastic and growing at a rate,
at; such that At = (1 + at)At￿1, where at is assumed identically and independently
distributed. The return to capital and the wage rate are standard and de￿ned by
rt (Kt) = f0 (Kt) and Wt (Kt) = f (Kt) ￿ Ktf0 (Kt), and kt￿1 ￿ Kt=(At￿1Lt￿1)
de￿nes the capital-labour ratio over growth rates.11 By assuming that ￿rms are
identical, capital will be accumulated through the savings of workers, i.e. Kt+1 =
9The increase in utility of a longer working or retirement period is o⁄set by a corresponding
increase in the implicit prices of consumption and leisure in the intertemporal budget constraint.
10Evidently, if the longevity of current retirees increases, the retirement period would residually
increase, given that the retirement age remains unchanged, and this would call for a higher contri-
bution rate. Similarly, an increase in the retirement age, given an unchanged length of life, would
yield a lower contribution rate. Last, but not least, if fertility falls so will the growth in the number
of workers and contributions need to rise to balance the PAYG budget.
11Since a smaller labour force leads to an increase in the capital-labour ratio, changes in factor
returns are likely to occur, see Kotliko⁄ et al. (2001), Murphy and Welch (1992) and Welch (1979).
6Nw
t St. Furthermore, we assume that over one generational period (app. 30 years)
capital fully depreciates. The constraint on the economy￿ s aggregate resources is,
Yt ￿ Kt+1 = ￿tNw
t c1t + ￿tNw
t￿1c2t (10)
which features the lengths of the working and retirement periods, respective, in
connection with the sub-period rates of consumption. This completes the outline of
the model. Next, we present our solution method.
2.5 Solving the model
We solve the model analytically for the responses of economic variables to changes
in fertility and the statutory retirement age. The solution method is designed to
provide analytical elasticities of economic variables with respect to stochastic shocks,
and it involves transforming the stochastic OLG model into a version that is log-
linearised around the steady state of the model. Our analytical approach facilitates
the isolation of the necessary response of the statutory retirement age that will o⁄set
any negative responses of labour supply12.
A version of the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, which relies on Uhlig (1999)
and extended by Jłrgensen (2008), is adopted to obtain the analytical solution for
the recursive equilibrium law of motion. The variables of the linearised model are
stated in e¢ ciency units and in terms of percentage deviations from the steady state
(marked with "hats")13. A linear law of motion for the recursive equilibrium of the
economy is conjectured,
b xt = Pb xt￿1 + Qb zt
b vt = Rb xt￿1 + Sb zt
which is characterised by linear relationships between endogenous state variables
in the vector b xt and exogenous state variables (the shocks) in the vector b zt. The
non-state endogenous (jump) variables are denoted by b vt. The coe¢ cients in the
matrices P, Q, R, and S are interpreted as elasticities.
As an example of how a given endogenous variable is determined by changes in
e.g. lagged fertility, b bt￿1, or the statutory retirement age, b ￿t, we illustrate the law
of motion for leisure,
b lt = ￿lkb kt￿1 + ￿lc2b c2t￿1 + ￿lb1b bt￿1 + ￿l￿b ￿t (11)
where, e.g., ￿l￿ denotes the elasticity (￿) of leisure (l) with respect to the retirement
age (￿)14.
A key advantage of this analytical approach is that the impact on leisure of
a change in the retirement age is stated in terms of an elasticity, ￿l￿, the size of
12The advantage of an analytical, closed form, solution is that changes in any economic variable
can be traced back to the underlying parameters and fundamental properties of the model. Thereby,
valuable intuition on the impact of falling fertility on economic variables can be gained.
13See Appendix A for more details on the solution technique.
14All endogenous variables fb kt;b c1t; b c2t; b lt; b yt; b Rt; b wt; b ￿tg can be expressed in this fashion. The







(11) only illustrates the shocks to lagged fertility and the statutory retirement age. The vector of
endogenous state variables is fb kt;b c2tg so these remain in equation (11) no matter which shocks are
examined.
7which, by construction, assumes a 1% shock to the statutory retirement age, b ￿t.
Therefore, we simply ask: "how will leisure change if there was suddenly an increase
in the statutory retirement age of 1%?". Using this terminology, we basically make
comparative statics with a model that is otherwise designed to be stochastic15. This
procedure is, by now, standard in the real-business-cycle literature (see, e.g., Uhlig,
1999). Our contribution, in this context, is to tailor the method in Uhlig (1999) to
￿t a stochastic OLG model, which is complicated by changes in the retirement age
that implies future changes in length of the retirement period.
The elasticities can be interpreted (both analytically and numerically) and em-
ployed in connection with the design of policy rules for the retirement age when
fertility has fallen and brought down the size of the labour force. We calibrate the
analytical expressions of the model with values, in table 1, that we trust are realis-
tic, and subsequently derive the numerical elasticities of the model. Importantly, we
make robustness analyses with the weight on leisure in the utility function in section
4, since the model predictions depend crucially on the calibration of this parameter.
Parameter Value Interpretation of steady state parameters
￿ 1=3 The capital share in output
￿ 0:35 The pension replacement rate16
a 0:40 The steady state growth rate of productivity
￿ 1 The rate of capital depreciation
￿ 1 The length of the working period
￿ 1 The length of the retirement period
b 0:1 The rate of growth in the number of children
￿ 1 The weight on leisure in the utility function
￿￿1(b) 1 The elasticity on the weight of ￿rst period
consumption in utility with respect to the birth rate
￿2 0:292 The consumption discount rate17
Table 1. Parameter calibration
3 Equilibrium with shocks
How will a fall in fertility a⁄ect the e⁄ective supply of labour? Obviously, the size of
the labour force falls with the decline in past fertility. Labour may be supplied by
households more or less intensively, though, when fertility has fallen. In addition, if
the retirement age rises in response to a shrinking labour force this, in itself, may
also lead to a more or less intensive supply of labour.
Two shocks are examined, namely an exogenous shock to the lagged birth rate,
b bt￿1, and an exogenous change in the retirement age, b ￿t. We the derive the elas-
ticities of economic variables with respect to these two shocks. In this section we
assume that changes in the statutory retirement age are outside government control
￿as if the changes were stochastic. This provides insights as to how the economy and
15Note that the size of a stochastic shock to, e.g., fertility could be any value from a given
pre-speci￿ed distribution of innovations.
16The payroll tax rate will then be ￿ = ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)=(1 + n
w) = 0:30.
17The calibration of the discount rate equals 0.960 per year or 0.292 over a 30 year period, and
generates a savings rate of 20%.
8intergenerational distributions of welfare are a⁄ected by demographic shocks under
a passive policy framework. In section 4, however, the statutory retirement age is
assumed to be under government control and used as a policy instrument18. We
limit the focus on leisure (b lt) and consumption (b c1t) for workers, as well as retirees￿
consumption (b c2t).
3.1 E⁄ects of low fertility
In this section we analyse the macroeconomic impacts of the signi￿cant historical
declines in fertility rates. A lagged shock to fertility is therefore the focus. The econ-
omy is represented by a linear law of motion in terms of elasticities for endogenous
variables with respect to a positive fertility shock. These elasticities are reported
in table 2. The relevance of decomposing the net e⁄ect on each variable into var-
ious sub-e⁄ects is to get a better understanding of the magnitudes involved in the
numerical simulations.
Table 2. A fall in fertility
Variable Value Elasticity
￿c1b1 = ￿0:02 = [￿c2k ￿ ￿Rk]￿kb1
￿lb1 = ￿0:11 = ￿c1b1 + ￿23￿￿b1 ￿ ￿22￿wb1
￿c2b1 = 0:54 = [￿15￿lb1 ￿ ￿3￿c1b1 ￿ ￿5￿kb1 ￿ ￿2]=￿4
￿kb1 = ￿0:02 =
￿12￿wb1￿￿21￿lb1￿￿8￿￿b1
￿9￿wk￿￿7￿c2k+￿12￿Rk￿￿20￿lk
The key issue is how work-leisure choices will be determined subsequent to the
fertility decline. This result is subject to a number of counteracting e⁄ects and
remains theoretically ambiguous. Our simulations imply, however, that leisure will
increase by 0.11% after a 1% fertility fall19. The increase in leisure corresponds to
a reduction in the intensity of labour supply, which will magnify the initial fertility-
induced e⁄ect on the shrinking e⁄ective labour supply and the increasing capital-
labour ratio.
Changes in wages and pension contributions basically determine the e⁄ects on
workers￿consumption after the shock to fertility (see Jensen and Jłrgensen, 2008).
On the other hand, since labour supply is a choice-variable, consumption and leisure
are interrelated and indirectly a⁄ect the capital-labour ratio: more leisure leads to
an even higher capital-labour ratio, higher wages, and lower capital returns (see
￿gures 2a and 2b). Therefore, by examining the intertemporal budget constraint in
(5) we can analyse the substitution, income, and wealth e⁄ects on leisure20.
18In the present section, we are interested only in the e⁄ects of a change in the retirement age
and not in what causes that change. It is often more natural to think of a shock to the statutory
retirement age as exogenous to the agent and controlled by the government.
19Elasticities are, by construction, derived for a positive 1% shock to fertility. Therefore, the
elasticities of economic variables with respect to a negative fertility shock must be interpreted with
the opposite sign of those displayed in table 2.
20In the case where labour supply is exogenous (see, e.g., Jensen and Jłrgensen, 2008), the only
e⁄ect on the capital-labour ratio originates from the lower fertility rate.
9Figure 2a. Wage rate Figure 2b. Return to capital









Response to a one percent decline in fertility, lagged














































Response to a one percent decline in fertility, lagged





































Figure 2c. Workers￿leisure Figure 2d. Retirees￿consumption









-4 Response to a one percent decline in fertility, lagged















































Response to a one percent decline in fertility, lagged





































The substitution e⁄ect on leisure comes from a shrinking labour force that alters
factor payments: wages increase; the return to capital falls. The price (opportunity
cost) of leisure thus increases so the substitution e⁄ect on leisure is negative. A
given level of income can now buy less resulting in negative income e⁄ects on all
goods, including leisure. The wealth e⁄ect is positive for all goods, because the
increased wage rate appears in lifetime income21. The dynamics of leisure, as well
as retirees￿consumption, are illustrated by the simulated trajectories in ￿gures 2c
and 2d, respectively22.
In an in￿ uencial paper, Weil (2006) ￿nds that a key mechanism through which
aggregate income and welfare are a⁄ected by population ageing is the distortion
from taxes to fund PAYG pension systems. This mechanism is also present here:
the price on leisure depends on ￿; i.e. the (￿ at) PAYG contribution rate. With
labour supply being endogenous, this distorting tax rate implies that the positive
wealth e⁄ect will more than o⁄set the (negative) sum of substitution and income
e⁄ects (i.e. ￿lb1 = 0:11)23.
21See the right-hand side of the intertemporal budget constraint in equation (5).
22The dynamics of ￿rst-period consumption is identical to the simulated trajectory for leisure,
though larger numerically.
23The distorting e⁄ects increase with the size of the pension system, so the larger ￿ is the larger
is, the larger is ￿lb1. If taxation was lump sum and not distortionary these three e⁄ects will o⁄set
each other so the net e⁄ect on leisure is zero, given that intertemporal elasticity of substitution
equal to one, as in our case.
10There are additional e⁄ects to consider in order to obtain a complete analysis of
the impacts of low fertility. Due to, ￿rst, a changing capital-labour ratio and, second,
the presence of distortionary taxation we have to consider "factor price e⁄ects" and
"￿scal e⁄ects", respectively: a negative fertility shock implies that each worker (in
the smaller labour force) must pay more taxes (because the bene￿ts to retirees are
assumed ￿xed in a DB system). Thus the ￿scal e⁄ect is negative. In addition,
workers will receive higher wages due to the higher capital-labour ratio so the factor
price e⁄ect is positive. This net e⁄ect is caused by a direct e⁄ect and an indirect
e⁄ect: The population growth rate (1 + nw
t ) falls which directly reduces the size of
the labour force. The indirect e⁄ect is due to the endogenous response of leisure
(￿lb1 > 0) which has a reinforcing negative e⁄ect on labour supply. The implication
for e⁄ective labour supply is, therefore, that the initial negative e⁄ect from lower
fertility is ampli￿ed by lower intensity of labour supply due to the demand for more
leisure as a consumption-equivalent good.
The net e⁄ect on consumption is consequently ambiguous, but our simulations
show that consumption increases for a negative fertility shock: ￿c1b1 = 0:02 and
￿c2b1 = ￿0:54, such that workers gain in terms of consumption and leisure and re-
tirees lose in terms of consumption. Thus, there will be an uneven intergenerational
distribution of the economic e⁄ects. While such welfare implications will not be
pursued further in this paper, it is an interesting topic for future research.
3.2 E⁄ects of a higher statutory retirement age
The statutory retirement age can be used as a policy instrument to increase e⁄ective
labour supply by retaining workers in the labour force for a longer period of time
and denying them PAYG pension bene￿ts until this later date. Such changes will
have economic implications that should be well understood by policy makers before
designing a policy rule for the retirement age. The purpose of this section is to
present a positive analysis on how changes in the retirement age a⁄ect key economic
variables. We are only interested in the e⁄ects of an exogenous change in the retire-
ment age and not in what causes the change24. When we are well informed about
the implications of a change in the retirement age we move on, in the next section,
to present a normative analysis of the retirement age ￿based on the assumption
that the statutory retirement age is under government control.
An increase in the retirement age will tend to directly increase labour supply
and lower the length of the retirement period, which is in line with our speci￿cation
of the length of the retirement period is residually determined by the length of the
working period (￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿). As a result, workers need to save less for a shorter
retirement period.
The change in leisure is determined through the same channels as a fertility
shock: the substitution e⁄ect, the income e⁄ect, the wealth e⁄ect, and the ￿scal
24While we assume, in this section, that the statutory retirement age is exogenous to the consumer,
this will not be the case for the e⁄ective retirement age, because the intensity of labour supply is
endogenous to the household in this paper. If the statutory retirement age increases, no matter
why, households may decide to supply less labour. If one assumes that this reduction in labour
supply takes place towards the end of households￿working life (rather than being spread across all
sub-periods of the working period), the reduction re￿ ects the fact that people may retire earlier
based on their own savings and thus represent a fall in the e⁄ective retirement age.
11and factor price e⁄ects, respectively. These dynamics are all intertwined through
both exogenous and endogenous changes in the capital-labour ratio and changes in
the pension contributions and bene￿ts. The net e⁄ect on the capital-labour ratio is
negative if the intensity of labour supply does not endogenously fall more than the
retirement age has increased. In that case the net e⁄ect on capital returns remains
positive and the wage rate will fall. This will endeed be the case since the e⁄ective
labour supply increases by 0:96% because leisure increases by ￿l￿ = 0:04% for each
1%￿increase in the retirement age increases (see table 3)25.
Table 3. An increase in the retirement age
Variable Value Elasticity
￿c1￿ = 1:06 = [￿c2k ￿ ￿Rk]￿k￿ + (￿c2￿1 ￿ ￿R￿1)
￿l￿ = 0:04 =
[￿c2k￿￿Rk]￿k￿+(￿c2￿1￿￿R￿1)+(￿23￿￿￿+￿22￿11)
1+￿22￿11
￿c2￿ = 0:42 = [￿9￿wk ￿ ￿7￿c2k + ￿12￿Rk ￿ ￿20￿lk]￿k￿
￿￿21￿l￿ + ￿12￿w￿ ￿ ￿8￿￿￿
￿k￿ = ￿0:31 =
￿15￿l￿￿￿3￿c1￿￿￿4￿c2￿￿￿2
￿5
Regarding the ￿scal e⁄ect: workers now face more subperiods during which they
work and has to contribute to the ￿xed PAYG bene￿ts of retirees. This implies less
need for savings to ￿nance a shorter retirement period, so workers save less and free
resources for leisure and ￿rst-period consumption. Thus, a positive ￿scal e⁄ect.
In terms of substitution, income and wealth e⁄ects on leisure, we ￿nd that the
substitution e⁄ect is negative due to the net increase in the price on leisure. The
dynamics of factor payments therefore generates a positive wealth e⁄ect (lifetime
income increases dispropotionally to the fall in the wage rate but proportionally
to the increase in the statutory retirement age) and a negative income e⁄ect (an
unchanged level of income can buy less consumption and leisure since leisure has
become more expensive). The positive wealth e⁄ect o⁄sets the negative sum of
substitution and income e⁄ects, partly due to distortionary taxation, so the e⁄ect
on leisure is positive26.
A particularly important mechanism in this model is that we account for the
disutility of work in terms of less lifetime leisure when the retirement age increases,
i.e. workers will be induced to supply labour less intensively when the sub-periods
of full leisure in retirement are reduced.
25This is also con￿rmed by the elasticities of the wage rate and capital returns with respect to
the retirement age (￿w￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿l￿) = ￿0:32; ￿R￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿l￿) = 0:64) which represents
a negative (positive) factor price e⁄ects for workers (retirees). The direct e⁄ect on, e.g., capital
returns is (1 ￿ ￿) due to the fall in the capital-labour ratio, while the indirect e⁄ect originating
from endogenous labour supply is (1 ￿ ￿l￿).
26As a result of the dynamics above, workers receive a lower wage rate over a longer working
period, which renders the net impact on ￿rst-period consumption theoretically ambiguous. We ￿nd
that ￿c1￿ = 1:06 is positive, however, and that it depends, especially, on the need for less savings to
￿nance a shorter retirement period and a higher lifetime income due to more sub-periods of work.
Retirees tend to gain in terms of consumption. The net e⁄ect is ambiguous, but our simulations
show an increase in ￿c2￿.
12An increase in the retirement age does not yield an equal increase in e⁄ective
labour supply when fertility has declined. This complicates the analysis of an o⁄set-
ting policy rule for the statutory retirement age. That is precisely why it is crucial
to emphasize the dynamics of the intensive margin of labour supply relative to the
extensive margin. This is the topic of the next section.
4 Policy Reform
We have seen that three main forces are operating when fertility or the statutory
retirement age change: the factor price e⁄ect; the ￿scal e⁄ect; and the endogenous
intensity of labour supply (determined, in turn, by substitution, income and wealth
e⁄ects). In this section, we make use of our general equilibrium framework to derive
how much the statutory retirement age should increase in order to o⁄set the decline
in the labour force caused by low fertility in the past27. It is important, though,
which role one assigns to the statutory retirement age, and we operate under the
explicit assumption that the retirement age is an exogenous variable that is under
government control. Note, that our analyses are independent of the social desirability
of any intergenerational (welfare) distribution of the associated e⁄ects28.
The e⁄ective labour supply comprises three elements: ￿rst, the fertility rate,
b bt￿1; second, the extensive margin limited by the retirement age, b ￿t; and third, the
intensity with which workers work (the intensive margin, b ut = ￿b lt). The e⁄ective
labour supply is dt = (1 + nw
t )(1 ￿ lt), or in log-deviations from steady state:
b dt = b bt￿1 + b ￿t ￿b lt (12)
Assume ￿rst that the intensity of labour supply is exogenous and that we examine
a 1% decline in fertility. It is then clear from (12) that the necessary response of the
statutory retirement age, which would o⁄set the fertility decline, i.e. b dt = b ￿t+b bt￿1 ￿
0, would just be a proportional increase of b ￿t = 1%. However, if the intensity of
labour supply is in fact endogenous, so b lt 6= 0, then clearly the response of b ￿t would
have to be di⁄erent from 1%. In our case, the initial e⁄ect from the fertility decline
on the e⁄ective labour supply will be reinforced because leisure increases, so the
statutory retirement age would have to increase even more than 1%. To derive the
o⁄setting response of b ￿t we insert the linear law of motion for b lt to obtain:
b ￿t = [￿lb1b bt￿1 + ￿l￿b ￿t] ￿b bt￿1 (13)
From (13) isolate b ￿t, and insert the numerical elasticities, ￿lb1 and ￿l￿, and the
negative fertility shock, b bt￿1 = ￿1:





b bt￿1 = 1:15 (14)
27Proposals for using the retirement age as a policy instrument are found in, e.g., de la Croix et al.
(2004) and Andersen, Jensen and Pedersen (2008). Also, Cutler (2001) recommends an extention
of Bohn (2001) to incorporate "the length of the period where people work".
28Jensen and Jłrgensen (2008) evaluates the attractiveness of an uneven distribution of the eco-
nomic e⁄ects associated with low fertility in a model with exogenous labour supply, while Jłrgensen
(2008) does so in a model with endogenous labour supply.
13Observe that if ￿lb1 < ￿l￿ the optimal response is b ￿t > 1. So, we conclude that
the statutory retirement age has to increase more than fertility fell in order to o⁄set
the negative impact on the e⁄ective labour force. The o⁄setting response of the
statutory retirement age, when b bt￿1 = ￿1% and the weight on leisure in utility is
￿ = 3, amounts to b ￿t = 1:15%.
These dynamics are due to the choice of leisure by individuals, which will in-
crease both when fertility falls and when the statutory retirement age increases.
Thus, the negative fertility-impact on labour supply is ampli￿ed. Since the weight
that households place on leisure is so crucial to the macroeconomic dynamics when
the labour force shrinks, this weight should be tested for alternative values. The
literature suggests various values for ￿ generally within the range ￿ 2 f1;9g (see,
e.g., Blackburn and Cipirani, 2002; Cardia, 1997; Chari et al., 2000; Jonsson, 2007).
We have calibrated our model with ￿ = 3, as an example, and found the o⁄set-
ting response of the statutory retirement age to be larger than the fertility rate
(b ￿t = 1:15). In terms of robustness analysis, however, we simulate the value for b ￿t
given alternative values for ￿ and illustrate the results in ￿gure 3.
Figure 3. Robustness analysis
For ￿ = 0, the analysis for the o⁄setting response of b ￿t corresponds to the
exogenous labour supply scenario. The 1% fall in fertility can therefore be exactly
o⁄set by a 1% increase in the statutory retirement age. For small values of ￿
there is a tendency for the o⁄setting response of the statutory retirement age to
be even less than the fertility-induced fall in labour supply. This means that a
contraction in the labour force combined with an increase in the statutory retirement
age increases the intensity of labour supply (reduces leisure). The large (net) increase
in the price on leisure, (1 ￿ ￿)w￿, when fertility falls and the statutory retirement
age increases, drives the substitution and income e⁄ects to outweigh the wealth
e⁄ect so the intensity of labour supply increases. As the weight on leisure increases
beyond app. 1.6 this trend is reversed. Households now value leisure to such a
high extent that substitution and income e⁄ects no longer dominate the decision to
"purchase" leisure. The higher the preference for leisure the greater the tendency
14to substitute for leisure, and this trend exerts downward pressure on the intensity
of labour supply. As a result, the o⁄setting response of the statutory retirement age
becomes increasingly larger than the fall in fertility (the grey area in ￿gure 3).
An important question now arises: what is the empirical trend in the preference
for leisure? If households over the past decades have had a tendency to substitute
for more leisure as real wages (and, thus, the price on leisure) have increased, then
the o⁄setting response of the statutory retirement age is likely to equal a value on
the curve in the grey area of ￿gure 3. In that case, policy makers should take the
resulting dynamics into account when designing policy rules for the retirement age
in order to overcome the problems for welfare arrangement when fertility, and thus,
labour supply has fallen.
According to Pencavel (1986), the share of life that men spend at work for pay
has fallen signi￿cantly. In fact, workers are retiring from the labour force at younger
ages, the number of hours worked per day or per week has fallen, and the number of
holidays has increased - and holidays have become longer. Schmidt-Słrensen (1983)
￿nds for Denmark that the number of working hours per week fell by 25% over
the period 1911-83, and by 15% over the period 1955-83. Similarly, the number of
working hours per year fell by 34% over the period 1911-81.
While the fraction of lifetime spent at market work may also have fallen because
more time has been allocated to human capital investment, by spending more years
within the educational system, the empirical evidence clearly suggests that the pref-
erence for leisure has been increasing for decades. It is therefore likely that the
dynamics of the economy, when facing a shrinking labour force, will generate more
demand for leisure as real wages increase. This implies that the o⁄setting response
of the labour force will be in a more than 1:1 relationship to the contraction in the
labour force. A model which does not incorporate labour supply as a choice vari-
able may fail to capture some important macroeconomic dynamics. The ability to
analyse the impacts of shrinking labour forces for various values for the preference
for leisure thus marks a signi￿cant extension of the framework used by, e.g., Bohn
(2001). Such an analysis would not be feasible without the explicit relationship in
the model between the extensive and intensive margins of labour supply.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed an intertemporal setting in which retirement policy can be
used to correct for fertility-induced changes in the supply of labour. Our main ￿nding
is that the retirement age should increase more than proportionately to a fertility
decline in order to account for negative responses of the intensity of labour supply.
However, this result depends crucially on the preference for leisure by households.
In line with empirical evidence there has been a tendency for leisure to rise when
real wages increase. And real wages tend to increase when labour supply shrinks as
a result of a fertility decline. Therefore, the necessesary o⁄setting response of the
stautory retirement age is likely to be even higher than previously believed. Without
an analytical framework linking the endogenous intensive margin to the extensive
margin of labour supply, this analysis would not be feasible.
An additional ￿nding is that leisure may increase when the statutory retirement
15age increases. This could be interpreted as an endogenous drop in the voluntary
early retirement age, ￿nanced by workers￿own savings. This is exactly the opposite
of what is intended by the policy rule of increasing the statutory retirement age.
This counteracting mechanism is part of the underlying reason why we derive a
more-than-proportionate o⁄setting increase in the statutory retirement age.
The analytical framework is subject to a number of limitations. The utility
function has been modelled in accordance with our best beliefs of how to incorporate
the value of leisure and the lengths of periods. However, the robustness of our
result could be examined in greater detail for alternative speci￿cations of the utility
function: for example, by adopting a CES speci￿cation that allows for robustness
analyses with respect to the elasticity of substitution. In addition, we assume that
the economic impacts of changes in dependency ratios can be analysed in a linearised
model. Simulation excercises with CGE models should, in the future, be performed
to yield a more empirically accurate, and country-speci￿c, foundation for designing
a policy rule for the retirement age. Last but not least, human capital accumulation
may have the implication that workers choose to invest in education to a higher
extent when fertility is low because they receive higher wages. As a result, the
supply of labour may incorporate a higher productivity. Thus, there may be less
need for the statutory retirement age to increase to completely o⁄set the smaller
labour force. These issues may modify our results, and are interesting subjects for
future research.
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17A The solution method
The way we apply the method of undetermined coe¢ cients relies on Uhlig (1999).
The method is adapted, though, to the stochastic OLG structure of our model in
line with Jłrgensen (2008). This appendix provides a brief overview of the solution
method, but we refer to the aforementioned authors for more details. All endogenous
variables from the log-linearised model, b et 2 fb kt;b c2t; b c1t; b lt; b yt; b Rt; b wt; b ￿tg, are
written as linear functions of a vector of endogenous and exogenous state variables,
respectively. The vector of endogenous state variables is b xt 2 fb kt; b c2tg of size m￿129,
the vector of endogenous non-state variables is b vt 2 fb c1t; b lt; b yt; b Rt; b wt; b ￿tg of size







t g of size g ￿1. The log-linearised equations are in written matrix notation in
the following equilibrium relationships,
0 = Ab xt + Bb xt￿1 + Cb vt + Db zt (15)
0 = Et [Fb xt+1 + Gb xt + Hb xt￿1 + Jb vt+1 + Kb vt + Lb zt+1 + Mb zt] (16)
b zt+1 = Nb zt + "t+1; Et ["t+1] = 0 (17)
where C is of size h￿j, where h denotes the number of non-expectational equations.
In this particular OLG model h = j, due to the de￿nition of b xt = fb kt; b c2tg, because
with merely the capital stock as a state variable h < j, and the system cannot not
be solved30. The matrix F is of size (m + j ￿ h) ￿ j, and it is assumed that N has
only stable eigenvalues.
The recursive equilibrium is characterized by a conjectured linear law of motion
between endogenous variables in the vector b et, and state variables (endogenous and
exogenous, respectively) in the vectors b vt and b zt. The conjectured linear law of
motion is written as,
b xt = Pb xt￿1 + Qb zt (18)
b vt = Rb xt￿1 + Sb zt (19)
where the coe¢ cients in the matrices P, Q, R, and S are interpreted as elasticities.
These linear relationships between endogenous variables and state variables could
alternatively be written out for each variable in b et., as e.g for leisure, b lt,
b lt = ￿lkb kt￿1 + ￿lc2b c2t￿1 + ￿l￿1b ￿t￿1 + ￿l￿b ￿t + ￿lab at
+￿lb1b bt￿1 + ￿lbb bt + ￿l￿e1b ￿
e
t￿1 + ￿l￿eb ￿
e
t + ￿l￿ub ￿
u
t
where e.g. ￿la denotes the elasticity (￿) of leisure (l) with respect to productivity
(a). The stability of the system is determined by the stability of the matrix P, given
the assumptions on the matrix N.
The stable solution for this system boils down to solving a matrix-quadratic
equation in line with Uhlig (1999). The matrix-quadratic equation can be solved as
29In order to solve the model it is necessary to have at least as many state variables as there are
expectational equations in the model (h ￿ j).
30Note that if h > j the equations in this section become slightly more complicated, see Uhlig
(1999), but a solution is still feasible.
18a generalized eigenvalue-eigenvector problem, where the generalized eigenvalue, ￿,
and eigenvector, q, of matrix ￿ with respect to ￿ are de￿ned to satisfy:
￿￿q = ￿q
0 = (￿ ￿ ￿￿)q
For this particular stochastic OLG model ￿ is invertible so the generalized eigen-
value problem can be reduced to a standard eigenvalue problem of solving instead
the expression ￿￿1￿ for eigenvalues-eigenvectors, as in (20). Then, ￿￿1￿ is diago-




q = 0 (20)
P = ￿￿￿1￿￿
￿1 (21)
The matrix ￿￿1￿ =diag (￿;:::;￿m) then contains the set of eigenvalues from which
a saddle path stable eigenvalue can be identi￿ed, and the matrix ￿ = [q1;:::;qm]
contains the characteristic vectors. Ultimately, the matrix P, governing the dynam-
ics of the OLG model, is derived, and the system can be "unfolded" to provide the
elasticities in the matrices Q; R; and S. For more detail on the solution technique
for RBC models we refer to Uhlig (1999).
19